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ABSTRACT
We develop an empirical search-matching model which is suitable for analyzing the wage, employment
and welfare impact of regulation in a labor market with heterogeneous workers and jobs. To achieve
this we develop an equilibrium model of wage determination and employment which extends the current
literature on equilibrium wage determination with matching and provides a bridge between some of
the most prominent macro models and microeconometric research. The model incorporates productivity
shocks, long-term contracts, on-the-job search and counter-offers. Importantly, the model allows for
the possibility of assortative matching between workers and jobs due to complementarities between
worker and job characteristics. We use the model to estimate the potential gain from optimal regulation
and we consider the potential gains and redistributive impacts from optimal unemployment insurance
policy. Here optimal policy is defined as that which maximizes total output and home production,
accounting for the various constraints that arise from search frictions. The model is estimated on the
NLSY using the method of moments.
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1 Introduction
Labor market imperfections justify labor market interventions. Within a competitive framework
regulation would be welfare reducing, as it would typically reduce employment and increase in-
siders’ wages. By contrast, any friction constraining the allocation of workers to jobs inevitably
spawns many mismatched job-worker pairs and allows some agents to appropriate a greater share
of the rent than a central planner would deem fit. Indeed, if there are important complemen-
tarities in production, mismatch may produce substantial welfare losses relative to the first best
or a constrained planner. In the now large body of literature using search models to describe
labor markets with heterogeneous agents, no paper, as far as we know, has estimated a search-
matching model with two-sided heterogeneity and used it to infer the welfare cost of mismatched
workers and firms. A fortiori, no empirical study has evaluated the role of standard labor market
regulations, such as unemployment insurance, in augmenting or reducing mismatch. Our aim in
this paper is to lay a first foundation stone to fill this gap.
We develop a search-matching model in which workers with diﬀerent abilities are assigned to
diﬀerent tasks. Our model links with the current literature on equilibrium search and assortative
matching. It extends the model of Shimer and Smith (2000) in various directions (wage determi-
nation, on-the-job search, shocks to individual characteristics) and provides a bridge between an
essentially theoretical literature on allocation of heterogeneous workers to jobs1, and the large
microeconometric literature on job mobility and wage dynamics.2
We estimate our model using panel data on workers and use the estimates to quantify how
much sorting there is with respect to unobserved characteristics. A first set of studies interested
in this question follow Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999, AKM) and assess the degree of
assortative matching in the labor market by calculating the correlation between worker and firm
fixed eﬀects estimated by a panel-data regression of individual wages on workers’ and employers’
indexes.3 They typically find non-significant or negative correlations. However, Andrews, Gill,
Schank, and Upward (2008) show that this estimated correlation is contaminated by a spurious
statistical bias and propose a bias-corrected estimator. Using German IAB data, they find that
the negative OLS estimate is turned into a positive number after applying the bias correction
(0.23 instead of somewhere in the range [−0.19,−0.15]).
However, Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) strongly argue against the possibility of identifying
assortative matching in labor market by this approach, bias-corrected or not. This is because
the surplus of a match is not a monotonic function of worker and firm characteristics in general.
Depending on the distribution of matches around the optimal, Beckerian allocation, a positive or
a negative AKM correlation can be estimated irrespective of the sign of the correlation between
1See also Shi (2001), Teulings and Gautier (2004), Moscarini (2005)and Gautier, Teulings, and van Vuuren
(2010) for alternative approaches to two-sided matching models without and with on-the-job search.
2See amongst others MaCurdy (1982), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abowd and Card (1989), Topel (1991),
Topel and Ward (1992), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Altonji and Williams (2005), Guvenen (2007), Bonhomme
and Robin (2009), Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2009), Guvenen (2009), Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010),
Lise (2012).
3See Goux and Maurin (1999) and Abowd, Kramarz, Pérez-Duarte, and Schmutte (2009) who present results
for French and U.S. matched employer-employee data, and Gruetter and Lalive (2009) for Austrian data.
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workers’ and firms’ true unobserved characteristics in the population of active matches. We also
find that the AKM correlation is misleading and show evidence that positive sorting with respect
to unobserved characteristics may induce a negative correlation in the worker and firm eﬀects
estimated on a panel of wages. Lopes de Melo (2009), Bagger and Lentz (2012), Hagedorn, Law,
and Manovskii (2012) reach similar conclusions with diﬀerent models.
Identification of complementarity and sorting, given that we use a panel of workers’ wages
and labor market transitions extracted from the NLSY,4 is also hard to prove or disprove theo-
retically. However, we argue that sorting can be seen in the way wage and employment mobility
vary as a function of the length of time spent working following an unemployment spell. Due
to search frictions, the cohort of workers entering the labor market following a spell out of work
will start oﬀ mismatched, but through on-the-job search they will become better and better
matched with time spent in the labor market. If the tendency to sort in equilibrium is strong
this will result in wages spreading out as workers sort themselves. Monte Carlo simulations for
the Simulated Method of Moment estimator that we have implemented here seem to suggest that
the set of moments we match do the degree of identify sorting. We find that the NLSY data are
best fitted by our model assuming no complementarity and zero sorting for high-school dropouts
and positive complementarity and sorting for high-school graduates and college-graduates.
Finally, our model oﬀers an empirical framework for understanding employment and wage
determination in the presence of firm-worker complementarities, search frictions and produc-
tivity shocks. As a result it oﬀers a way for evaluating the extent to which regulation may
be welfare improving and can evaluate the impact of specific policies such as unemployment
insurance. In a search framework with match complementarities unemployment insurance can
have ambiguous eﬀects on employment and total output. On the one hand, it allows workers
to be more picky and form better matches, which comes at the cost of longer unemployment
spells and higher unemployment. On the other hand, the fact that higher quality matches will
be formed may induce firms to create more jobs, increasing the contact rate and potentially
reducing unemployment duration. Our framework allows this eﬀect to be quantified. And, in
addition, it allows us to analyze the eﬀect of such policies on the distribution of welfare thus
showing who pays and who benefits from such a policy in this non-competitive environment.
We find that the degree to which labor market interventions are justified depends on whether
we are looking at the low, medium or high skilled markets. Our finding that the market for
unskilled labor (high school drop outs) is characterized by an extremely low degree of comple-
mentarity implies that mismatch is not very costly, indeed a constrained social planner would
not choose to alter the allocation. In contrast, the high degree of complementarity we find in the
markets for higher skilled labor (high school graduates and college graduates) implies that the
mismatch of workers to jobs arising in the decentralized equilibrium is quite costly. As a result,
a constrained planner can improve total output by trading oﬀ the level of employment against
4We preferred to stick to standard worker panel data for two reasons. First, matched employer-employee data
are less universal and not always easily accessible to researchers. Second, value-added per worker (used by Cahuc
et al., Bagger et al. and Bagger and Lentz) does not measure well the labor productivity of a single job isolated
from the other jobs in a firm.
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the quality of matches—choosing a lower employment level (and fewer costly vacancies) and
higher output per match by preventing low quality matches from forming (which also reduces
the congestion externality). Finally, we find that if we limit the planner to an optimal unem-
ployment insurance program, this can go a long way to realizing the potential welfare gains for
the high school group. However, it is ineﬀectual for the college educated group as the resulting
employment distortions outweigh the gains from improved match quality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and Section 3 the estimation
procedure. Section 4 presents the results of estimation, analyses the fit and discusses estimation
of the degree of sorting. Section 5 presents the welfare analysis. Section 6 analyses in detail
unemployment insurance policy. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is an equilibrium model of the labor market in which all agents behave optimally and
wages are endogenous. It produces rich individual level dynamics, and endogenous distributions
of worker-job matches, unemployed workers, and vacant jobs. There is no aggregate uncertainty,
and hence we focus on stationary equilibrium.
In this economy there are a fixed number of infinitely lived individuals, while the number
of jobs is endogenously determined so that the marginal entrant makes zero expected profits.
Workers are matched pairwise to jobs or tasks. They diﬀer from each other according to abil-
ity, and ability diﬀerences are permanent. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), jobs are
subject to persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which can trigger separations and wage
renegotiations. The production function allows for complementarity between worker and job
characteristics, leading to the possibility of sorting in the labor market. Any worker-job pair
that meet will form a match when the surplus is non-negative — this accounts for the option
value of each partner of continuing to search for a better partner. Worker and firm heterogeneity
may be unobserved by the econometrician but they are observed by all parties when meetings
take place. Workers receive job oﬀers while unemployed or employed at rates that diﬀer in the
two states and depend on the endogenously determined market tightness. Search on the job may
trigger quits and wage renegotiations. We assume random matching within a well defined labor
market (defined by worker education), so while workers cannot direct their search to specific
firm types within their labor market, they direct their search to jobs segmented by educational
requirements. We do not explicitly model how this segmentation arises.
An important feature of the model is that it generates wage dynamics. We assume that
wage contracts are long-term contracts which can be renegotiated only when one of the partners
can make a credible threat to walk away from the match, and employers counter outside oﬀers.
We use the sequential auction framework of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) extended to allow
for an extra layer of Nash bargaining as in Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2006). On-the-job search may thus lead to outside oﬀers and hence to wage changes
and/or mobility. In addition, firm-level productivity shocks may move the current contract
outside the bargaining set and lead to wage renegotiation or to match dissolution and a period
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of unemployment before reentering at a diﬀerent wage (see Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010). The
wage dynamics are thus explained by the structure of the model. The question is whether the
predicted dynamics match those documented in the empirical papers mentioned earlier. If they
do this oﬀers a structural interpretation to such processes based on productivity shocks and
behavioral responses in wage setting. Note that in this paper we abstract from human capital
accumulation, which, while important, would complicate matters beyond the scope of this first
paper.5
2.1 Workers, jobs and matches
Each individual worker is characterized by a level of permanent ability, continuously distributed
across workers, observable by all agents, but not by the researcher. Let x denote the rank of
ability across workers. There are L individuals of which U are unemployed. We also denote by
u(x) the (endogenous) measure density of x among the unemployed.
Jobs are characterized by a technological factor, say labor productivity, which is also con-
tinuous and observable by all agents, but not the researcher. Let y denote the rank of labor
productivity across jobs, vacant or filled. There are N jobs in the economy, a number that
is endogenously determined. The endogenous measure density of vacant posts is v(y) and the
resulting number of vacancies is denoted by V =
￿
v(y) dy.
In a given job there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These may reflect changes in the
product market (shifts in the demand curve) or events such as changes in work practices or
investments (which here are not modeled). We assume that y fluctuates according to a jump
process: shocks arrive at a rate δ, and a new productivity level y￿ is drawn from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Thus the size of δ determines the persistence of the shocks.
A match between a worker of type x and a job of productivity y produces a flow of output
f(x, y). We will specify this function to allow for the possibility that x and y are complementary
in production, implying that sorting will increase total output. However, we wish to determine
this empirically, as it is important both for understanding the labor market and for evaluating
the potential eﬀects of regulation. Matches can end both endogenously, as we characterize later,
and exogenously. We denote by ξ the rate of exogenous job destructions, defined as an event
that is unrelated to either worker or job characteristics.
Equilibrium will result in a joint distribution of x and y, the distribution of matches. We
denote this by h(x, y). Because x and y are uniformly distributed in the whole populations
of workers and jobs, a simple adding up constraint implies that all matched workers and the
unemployed sum up to L: ￿
h(x, y) dy + u(x) = L. (1)
Similarly all matched jobs and posted vacancies should add up to the total number of jobs N :￿
h(x, y) dx+ v(y) = N. (2)
5One possibility to make this extension tractable is to assume piece-rate contracts as in Barlevy (2008) and
Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2011).
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2.2 Match formation
Individuals and jobs are risk neutral and we assume eﬃciency, in the sense that any match where
the surplus is positive will be formed when the worker and the job meet. Under these conditions
we can characterize the set of equilibrium matches and their surplus separately from the sharing
of the surplus between workers and jobs.
Let W0(x) denote the present value of unemployment for a worker with characteristic x.
This will reflect the flow of income when out of work (or home production) and the expected
present value of income that will arise following a successful job match. Similarly Π0(y) denotes
the present value to a job of posting a vacancy arising from the expected revenues of employing
a suitable worker net of expected posting costs. Let also W1(w, x, y) (respectively Π1(w, x, y))
denote the present value of a wage contract w for a worker x employed at a job y (respectively
the firm’s discounted profit).
The surplus of an (x, y) match is defined by
S(x, y) = Π1(w, x, y)−Π0(y) +W1(w, x, y)−W0(x). (3)
For a pair (x, y) a match is feasible and sustainable if the surplus is nonnegative, S(x, y) ≥ 0.
2.3 Wage negotiation with unemployed workers
The wage for a worker transiting from unemployment is w = φ0(x, y) and we assume that it is
set to split the surplus according to Nash bargaining with worker’s bargaining parameter β:
W1 (φ0(x, y), x, y)−W0(x) = βS(x, y). (4)
Through the process of on-the-job search and oﬀers/counteroﬀers her wage will subsequently
grow. A simple assumption would be to set β to zero. However this may lead to the counterfac-
tual implication that for some matches initial wages are negative implying workers pay to obtain
a high value job with the potential of future wage increases. Although this is not implausible
(unpaid internships) this is never observed in our survey data. By allowing β to be determined
by the data we avoid this problem and allow greater flexibility in fitting the facts.
2.4 Renegotiation
Wages can only be renegotiated when either side has an interest to separate if they do not obtain
an improved oﬀer, assuming that the match remains viable for both parties. The events that
can trigger renegotiation occur when a suitable outside oﬀer is made, or when a productivity
shock changes the value of the surplus suﬃciently. We consider first the impact of an outside
oﬀer.
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2.4.1 Poaching
A key source of wage renegotiation and growth in this model is on-the-job search. This generates
alternative opportunities for workers and either job mobility or responses to the outside oﬀers
with resulting wage increases. We assume that incumbent employers respond to outside oﬀers:
a negotiation game is then played between the worker and both jobs as in Dey and Flinn (2005)
and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006).
If a worker x, currently paired to a job y such that S(x, y) ≥ 0, finds an alternative job y￿ such
that S(x, y￿) ≥ S(x, y), the worker moves to the alternative job. This is because the poaching
firm can always pay more than the current one can match. Alternatively, if the alternative job
y￿ produces less surplus than the current job, but more than the worker’s share of the surplus
at the current job, i.e. W1−W0(x) < S(x, y￿) < S(x, y) (where W1 denotes the present value of
the current contract), then the worker uses the outside oﬀer to negotiate up her wage. Lastly, if
S(x, y￿) ≤ W1 −W0(x), the worker has nothing to gain from the competition between y and y￿
because she cannot make a credible threat to leave, and the wage does not change.
In either one of the first two cases, the worker ends up in the higher surplus match, and uses
the lower surplus match as the outside option when bargaining. Assume S(x, y) ≥ S(x, y￿). The
bargained wage in this case is w = φ1(x, y, y￿) such that the worker obtains the entire surplus
of the incumbent job plus a share of the incremental surplus between the two jobs, i.e.
W1
￿
φ1(x, y, y￿), x, y
￿−W0(x) = S(x, y￿) + β ￿S(x, y)− S(x, y￿)￿ (5)
= βS(x, y) + (1− β)S(x, y￿).
The share of the increased surplus β accruing to the worker will be determined empirically.
In our approach there is an asymmetry between workers and firms because the latter do not
search when the job is filled. As a result they do not fire workers when they find an alternative
who would lead to a larger total surplus, nor do they force wages down when an alternative
worker is found whose pay would imply an increased share for the firm. We decided to impose
this asymmetry because in many institutional contexts it is hard for the firm to replace workers
in this way. Moreover, we suspect that even when allowed firms would be reluctant to do so
in practice. We do, however, allow firms to fire a worker when the current surplus becomes
negative and then immediately search for a replacement.
2.4.2 Productivity shocks
Another potential source of renegotiation is when a productivity shock changes y to y￿ thus
altering the value of the surplus. If y￿ is such that S(x, y￿) < 0, the match is endogenously
destroyed: the worker becomes unemployed and the job will post a vacancy.
Suppose now that S(x, y￿) ≥ 0. The value of the current wage contract w becomesW1(w, x, y￿).
Future pay negotiations whether due to productivity shocks or competition with outside oﬀers
will be aﬀected by the the new value of the match. However, the current wage may or may
not change. If the wage w is such that the worker is still obtaining at least as much as her
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outside option, without taking more than the new surplus, 0 ≤W1(w, x, y￿)−W0(x) ≤ S(x, y￿),
neither the worker nor the job has a credible threat to force renegotiation: both are better
oﬀ with the current wage w being paid to the worker than walking away from the match to
unemployment and to a vacancy respectively. In this case there will be no renegotiation. If,
however, W1(w, x, y￿) −W0(x) < 0 or W1(w, x, y￿) −W0(x) > S(x, y￿) (with S(x, y￿) ≥ 0) then
renegotiation will take place because a wage can be found that keeps the match viable and each
partner better oﬀ within the match relative to unemployment for the worker and a vacancy for
the job.
To define how the renegotiation takes place and what is the possible outcome we use a setup
similar to that considered by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Postel-Vinay and Turon
(2010). The new wage contract is such that it moves the current wage the smallest amount
necessary to put it back in the bargaining set. Thus, if at the old contractW1(w, x, y￿)−W0(x) <
0, a new wage w￿ = ψ0(x, y￿) is negotiated such that
W1(ψ0(x, y￿), x, y￿)−W0(x) = 0, (6)
which just satisfies the worker’s participation constraint. If at the new y￿,W1(w, x, y￿)−W0(x) >
S(x, y￿), a new wage w￿ = ψ1(x, y￿) such that the firm’s participation constraint is just binding
W1(ψ1(x, y￿), x, y￿)−W0(x) = S(x, y￿). (7)
Wages respond to job specific productivity shocks, but not always in an obvious direction.
Separations and pay changes may happen following both good shocks that increase the value
of productivity y and bad shocks that decrease it. It is all about mismatch: what matters is
what happens to the overall surplus. A positive productivity shock, for example, can imply that
the quality of the match becomes worse and the surplus declines, since the outside option of
the firm has changed and it may be worthwhile to separate from the current worker and post
a vacancy to find a better worker. Conversely a negative productivity shock can improve the
surplus if this means the job type is now closer to the optimal one sought by the worker. A
shock that reduces the surplus can still lead to a wage increase to compensate the worker who
is now matched with a job with fewer future prospects of wage increases. Thus what really
matters as far as the viability of the match and the possible options for renegotiation is whether
a shock improves or worsens a particular match, measured by whether it leads to an increase
or a decrease, respectively of the surplus. Later, in Subsection 4.4 we consider further the non-
monotonic relationship between wages and firm productivity, and the implications for empirical
estimates of the degree of sorting of workers across jobs.
2.5 The meeting function
We relate the aggregate number of meetings between vacancies and searching workers through a
standard aggregate matching functionM(·, ·). This takes as inputs the total number of vacancies
V and the total amount of eﬀective job seekers s0U + s1 (L− U). The matching function is
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assumed to be increasing in both arguments and exhibit constant returns to scale.
For the purpose of exposition it is useful to define
κ =
M(s0U + s1(L− U), V )
[s0U + s1(L− U)]V ,
which summarizes the eﬀect of market tightness in a single variable. In a stationary equilibrium
κ is constant, but it is not invariant to policy, and it is important to allow it to change when
evaluating interventions or counterfactual regulations. Note that while M(·, ·) governs the ag-
gregate number of meetings, whether or not a meeting translates into a match will be determined
by the decisions of workers and firms.
The matching parameter κ allows us to calculate all relevant meeting rates. The instanta-
neous rate at which an unemployed worker meets a vacancy of type y is s0κV · v(y)V = s0κv(y).
The instantaneous probability for any vacancy to make a contact with an unemployed worker
is s0κu(x). Employed workers are poached by jobs of type y with instantaneous probability
s1κv(y). Finally, the rate at which vacancies are contacted by a worker x employed at a job y
is s1κh(x, y).
2.6 Value functions
The next step in solving the model is to characterize the value functions of workers and jobs,
which have been kept implicit up to now. These define the decision rules for each agent. We
proceed by assuming that time is continuous.
2.6.1 Unemployed workers
Unemployed workers are always assumed to be available for work at a suitable wage rate. While
unemployed they receive income or money-metric utility (home production) depending on their
ability x and denoted by b(x). Thus the present value of unemployment to a worker of type x is
W0(x), which satisfies the option value equation
rW0(x) = b(x) + s0κβ
￿
S(x, y)+v(y) dy, (8)
where the discount rate is denoted by r and where we define in general a+ = max(a, 0). Thus
the integral represents the expected value of the surplus of feasible matches given the worker
draws from the distribution of vacant jobs v(y). She contacts a job of type y at a rate s0κv(y)
and the match is consummated if the surplus S(x, y) is non negative, in which case she gets a
share β of the surplus.
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2.6.2 Vacant jobs
Using (3), (4), and (5), the present value of profits for an unmatched job meeting a worker with
human capital x from unemployment is
Π1(φ0(x, y), x, y)−Π0(y) = (1− β)S(x, y).
where 1−β represents the proportion of the surplus retained by the firm and Π0(y) is the value
of a vacancy. A job meeting a worker who is already employed will have to pay more to attract
her. The value of a job with productivity y, meeting an employed worker in a lower surplus
match with productivity y￿ is
Π1(φ1(x, y, y￿), x, y)−Π0(y) = (1− β)
￿
S(x, y)− S(x, y￿)￿
Based on this notation, the present value of a vacancy for a job with productivity y is
rΠ0(y) = −c+ δ
￿ ￿
Π0(y￿)−Π0(y)
￿
dy￿ + s0κ (1− β)
￿
S(x, y)+u(x) dx
+ s1κ (1− β)
￿￿ ￿
S(x, y)− S(x, y￿)￿+ h(x, y￿) dx dy￿. (9)
The c is a per-period cost of keeping a vacancy open. The second term reflects the impact of
a change in productivity from y to y￿, assuming that productivity shocks continue to accrue
at rate δ when the job is vacant and assuming that the distribution of productivity shocks is
uniform [0,1]. The third term is the expected gain from matching with a previously unemployed
worker. The fourth term is the expected gain from poaching a worker who is already matched
with another job. The notation [·]+ ensures that integration is over all possible x and y￿ that
increase the current surplus.
We show in Appendix A that Π￿0(y) > 0 so that we can assume that the last job that enters
makes zero profit, Π0(0) = 0, that is
c = δ
￿
Π0(y￿)dy￿ + s0κ (1− β)
￿
S(x, 0)+u(x) dx
+ s1κ (1− β)
￿ ￿
S(x, 0)− S(x, y￿)￿+ h(x, y￿) dx dy￿. (10)
This condition will determine the number of potential jobs N in the economy. Firms enter the
market and draw a y in the uniform distribution, with N determined by the least productive
firm making zero profit.6
6Alternatively, we could (and we had in a previous version) assume that N is exogenously given and large
enough so there would exist a positive threshold y such that Π0(y) = 0. All vacant jobs with Π0(y) < 0 would
thus decide to remain “idle”, not paying the cost of posting a vacancy until a shock moves Π0(y) above 0. However,
this approach creates a nasty singularity at y, arising because a match with y < y may still be viable if it arises
after a negative productivity shock to an existing match as the vacancy costs have already been paid for this
match.
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2.6.3 Employed workers
In order to derive the wage rates we need to define the value of a job to a worker W1(w, x, y).
This is the present value to the worker of a wage contract w for a feasible match (x, y) (if
S(x, y) < 0 there is no match and no wage). Any wage contract w delivers w in the first unit
of time. The continuation value depends on competing events: the job may be terminated with
probability ξ; the job may be hit by a productivity shock with probability δ; the worker may be
poached with probability s1κV .
Given the above discussion, the flow value of working at wage rate w in a feasible match
(x, y) is determined by the following Bellman equation,
(r + δ + ξ + s1κv(A(w, x, y))) [W1(w, x, y)−W0(x)] = w − rW0(x)
+ δ
￿ ￿
min
￿
S(x, y￿),W1(w, x, y￿)−W0(x)
￿￿+
dy￿
+ s1κ
￿
A(w,x,y)
￿
βmax
￿
S(x, y), S(x, y￿)
￿
+ (1− β)min￿S(x, y), S(x, y￿)￿￿ v(y￿) dy￿, (11)
where
A(w, x, y) = ￿y￿ : W1(w, x, y)−W0(x) < S(x, y￿)￿
is the set of jobs that can lead to a wage change (either by moving or renegotiation) and
µ(A) =
￿
A µ(y) dy, for any set A and any density µ.
On the right hand side the first term is the wage net of the flow value of unemployment.
The second term is the expected excess value to the worker of a productivity shock (times the
probability that it occurs): in this case the worker either ends up with the entire new surplus or
the new value or indeed nothing if the match is no longer feasible (see equations (6) and (7)).
The third line is the expected excess value following an outside oﬀer as in equation (5). The
integral is over all oﬀers that can improve the value (whether the worker moves or not).
2.6.4 The match output and joint surplus
Having defined the non-employment value for the worker, the vacancy value for the firm, the
value of a contract w to the worker (with a similar expression for the value to the firm), we can
now calculate the surplus value S(x, y) defined by equation (3). We show in Appendix A that
the match surplus S(x, y) is eﬀectively independent of the current wage contract and is defined
by the fixed point in the following equation,
(r + ξ + δ)S(x, y) = f(x, y)− b(x) + c
− s0κβ
￿
S(x, y￿)+v(y￿) dy￿ − s0κ (1− β)
￿
S(x, y)+u(x) dx
− s1κ (1− β)
￿￿ ￿
S(x, y)− S(x, y￿)￿+ h(x, y￿) dx dy￿
+ s1κβ
￿ ￿
S(x, y￿)− S(x, y)￿+ v(y￿) dy￿ + δ ￿ S(x, y￿)+ dy￿. (12)
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Note that the surplus of an (x, y) match never depends on the wage. This follows from the
Bertrand competition between the incumbent and the poaching firm that is induced by on-
the-job search and disconnects the poached employee’s outside option from both the value of
unemployment and her current wage contract. Thus the Pareto possibility set for the value of
the worker and the job is convex in all cases, implying that the conditions for a Nash bargain are
satisfied. This contrasts with Shimer’s (2006) model, where jobs do not respond to outside oﬀers
and where the actual value of the wage determines employment duration in a particular job.
This feature also has a computational advantage since the equilibrium distribution of matches
can be determined without simultaneously computing the wage rates for workers.
2.7 Steady-state flow equations
The final set of equations needed to pin down the surplus and the distribution of matches are
those defining equilibrium in this economy. In a stationary equilibrium the number of jobs N ,
the distribution of matches as well as the distribution of x among the unemployed and of y
among the posted vacancies are all constant over time.
The total number of matches in the economy is
L− U = N − V =
￿
h(x, y) dx dy. (13)
Existing matches, characterized by the pair (x, y), can be destroyed for a number of reasons.
First, there is exogenous job destruction at a rate ξ; second, with probability δ, the job com-
ponent of match productivity changes to some value y￿ diﬀerent from y, and the worker may
move to unemployment or may keep the job forming a new match (x, y￿); third, the worker may
receive an oﬀer and quit to a higher surplus (x, y￿) match. On the inflow side, new (x, y) matches
are formed when some unemployed or employed workers of type x match with vacant jobs y, or
when (x, y￿) matches are hit with a productivity shock and exogenously change from (x, y￿) to
(x, y).
In a steady state all these must balance leaving the match distribution unchanged. Thus
formally we have for all (x, y) such that the match is feasible (i.e. S(x, y) ≥ 0),
￿
ξ + δ + s1κv(B(x, y))
￿
h(x, y) = [s0u(x) + s1h(x,B(x, y))]κv(y) + δ
￿
h(x, y￿) dy￿, (14)
where
B(x, y) = {y￿ : 0 ≤ S(x, y￿) < S(x, y)},
B(x, y) = {y￿ : S(x, y￿) ≥ S(x, y)},
are the sets of jobs that would imply (B) or not imply (B) an improvement of the match surplus
for x. Thus, s1κv(B(x, y)) is the probability of receiving an alternative oﬀer, when employed,
from a job that beats the current one.
This equation defines the steady-state equilibrium, together with the following accounting
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equations for the workers:
u(x) = L−
￿
h(x, y) dy = L
ξ + δ
￿
1{S(x, y) < 0} dy
ξ + δ
￿
1{S(x, y) < 0} dy + s0κv (M(x)) , (15)
where δ
￿
1{S(x, y) < 0} dy is the endogenous job destruction rate and s0κv(M(x)) is the job
finding rate (M(x) = {y : S(x, y) ≥ 0}).
For the jobs we have
v(y) = N −
￿
h(x, y) dx. (16)
The aggregate number of vacancies is then determined as V =
￿
v(y) dy. Note that one can
either say that the free entry condition fixes the number of jobs N and V follows, or that it fixes
the number of vacancies V and N follows as V + L− U .
2.8 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all agents follow their optimal strategy and the steady state flow equations defined
above hold. The exogenous components of the model are the number of potential workers L, the
form of the matching function M(·, ·) as well as the arrival rate of shocks δ, the job destruction
rate ξ, the search intensities for the unemployed s0 and employed workers s1, the discount rate r,
the value of home production (or leisure) b(x), the cost of posting a vacancy c, bargaining power
β, and the production function f(x, y). The distribution of worker types, of productivities and
of the shocks have all been normalized to uniform [0, 1], without loss of generality. Appendix
B provides a simple iterative algorithm that uses these equations and that of the surplus to
compute the equilibrium objects.
3 Estimation Methodology
In this section, we first present the estimation procedure, then the data. Then we discuss
the issue of measurement error on wages that comes with these data. We end this section by
describing the parametric specification of the model and the moments used in estimation. An
informal discussion of identification is provided in Section 3.5.
3.1 Estimation method
To estimate the model we use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) as constructing the
likelihood function for this model is intractable. The SMM approach works as follows. The
data sample allows us to calculate a vector of moments ￿mN = 1N ￿Ni=1mi, where for example,￿mN may be the mean wage for a given experience or the probability of being employed, or wage
change after t periods for job movers, etc. Given a value θ for the vector of structural parameters
one can simulate S alternative samples of wage trajectories yielding average simulated moments￿mMS (θ) = 1S ￿Ss=1mMs (θ), where the superscript M denotes a model generated quantity. The
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SMM aims at finding a value ￿θ maximizing
LN (θ) = −12
￿ ￿mN − ￿mMS (θ)￿T￿W−1N ￿ ￿mN − ￿mMS (θ)￿ ,
where ￿WN is taken to be the diagonal of the estimated covariance matrix of ￿mN . To compute
the variance of mi in the actual sample we use the bootstrap.
Because the simulated moments are not necessarily a smooth function of the parameters we
use a method developed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003), which does not require derivatives of
the criterion function. Chernozhukov and Hong do not maximize LN (θ). Instead, they construct
a Markov chain that converges to a stationary process of which the ergodic distribution has a
mode that is asymptotically equivalent to the SMM estimator. Appendix C describes this
procedure in detail.
3.2 The data
We use the 1979 to 2002 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) to
construct all moments used in estimation. The NLSY consists of 12,686 individuals who were
14 to 21 years of age as of January, 1979. It contains a nationally representative core random
sample, as well as an over-sample of black, Hispanic, the military, and poor white individuals.
For our analysis, we keep only white males from the core sample. Since the schooling decision
is exogenous to the model, we only include data for individuals once they have completed their
education. We also drop individuals who have served in the military, or have identified their
labor force status as out of the labor force. The majority of individuals who are not in the labor
force report being disabled and are clearly not searching for employment. We subdivide the
data into three education groups: less than high school education, high school degree or some
college, and college graduate. The model is estimated separately on each of these subgroups.
Individuals are interviewed once a year and provide retrospective information on their labor
market transitions and their earnings. From this we construct histories at a monthly frequency
aggregating the data as follows: we define a worker as employed in a given week if he worked
more than 35 hours in the week. We define a worker’s employment status in a month as the the
activity he was engaged in for the majority of the month, treating unemployment spells of two
weeks or less as job-to-job transitions. After sample selection, we are left with an unbalanced
panel of 2,022 individuals (325,462 person months).
We remove aggregate growth from wages in the NLSY, using estimates from the CPS data
1978-2008.7 We select white men in the CPS and regress the log wage on a full set of year
dummies and age dummies, separately for our three education groups. To remove aggregate
growth from the NLSY79 data, we subtract the coeﬃcient on the corresponding year dummy
from log wage. Our definition of wage in the NLSY is weekly earnings. We trim the data to
remove a very small number of outliers when calculating wage changes. When calculating month
to month wage changes, we exclude observations where the wage changes by more than a factor
7The trend cannot be estimated from the NLSY, which is a cohort and has an aging structure.
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of two. This results in variances of wage changes at the annual level that are broadly consistent
with PSID estimates (see e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).
3.3 Measurement error
Wages are likely to be measured with error. Indeed if we do not take this into account we will
distort both the variance of the shocks to productivity and the transitions, both of which drive
the variance of wage growth. We use the monthly records of wages in the NLSY. Thus, while
it may be reasonable to assume that measurement error is independent from one year to the
next it may not be so within the year, as all records are reported at the same interview with
recall. Having experimented with a number of alternatives, including a common equicorrelated
component across all months, we settled on a measurement error structure that is AR(1) within
year and independent across years. The serial correlation coeﬃcient together with the variance
of measurement error is estimated alongside the other parameters of the model.
3.4 Parametric specification
Estimating the model involves first parameterizing the production and the matching functions.
For the production function we have chosen a CES specification that allows us to estimate the
degree of sorting in the data. Thus we have
f(x, y) = f0
￿￿
exp
￿
f1Φ−1(x)
￿￿f3 + ￿exp ￿f2Φ−1(y)￿￿f3￿1/f3 ,
where Φ is the standard normal CDF, f1 is the standard deviation of x and f2 is the standard
deviation of productivity y. Thus we take the uniformly distributed characteristics and transform
them to log normally distributed variables with variances to be estimated. The parameter f0
determines the scale of wages. Finally the parameter f3 determines the degree of substitutability
between x and y with 1/(1−f3) being the elasticity of substitution. When f3 = 1 the production
function becomes additive and there are no complementarities between the inputs.
The matching function requires macroeconomic data on vacancies and unemployment to be
fully identified. We thus specify an elasticity of 0.5 for the meeting function:
M(U + s1 (L− U) , V ) = α
￿
[U + s1 (L− U)]V ,
where the search intensity for the unemployed has been normalized to one (Blanchard and
Diamond, 1991, Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The matching function allows the number of
matches to adapt to the number of vacancies and the unemployed and as such is important for
evaluating counterfactual policies.
3.5 Choice of moments
While using the likelihood function would have made use of all information in the data and the
model specification, the use of the method of moments requires a careful choice of moments
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Table 1: Moments Used in Estimation
(a) Unemployment to Employment transitions (U2E) E [(1− Ei,t−1)Ei,t]
(b) Employment to Unemployment transitions (E2U) E [Ei,t−1 (1− Ei,t)]
(c) Job-to-Job transitions (J2J) E [Ei,t−1Ei,tJi,t]
(d) Wage levels (zero if unemployed) E [Ei,twi,t]
(e) Wage growth within job E [Ei,t−1Ei,t (1− Ji,t)∆wi,t]
(f) Wage growth at job change E [Ei,t−1Ei,tJi,t∆wi,t]
(g) Variability of wages E
￿
Ei,tw2i,t
￿
(h) Variability of wage growth within job E
￿
Ei,t−1Ei,t (1− Ji,t)∆w2i,t
￿
(i) Variability of wage growth at job change E
￿
Ei,t−1Ei,tJi,t∆w2i,t
￿
(j) Employment rate E [Ei,t]
to ensure that our model parameters are identified. We explain our choice in this subsection
and we try to justify it by identification considerations. Given the complexity of the model and
inference, we can only oﬀer a heuristic argument for identification.
We use a set of unconditional moments, listed in Table 1. In particular, we use moments
related to the transitions between employment states and between jobs; the level of wages and
their cross sectional variance; and wage growth and its variance within and between jobs. Each
of these moments is calculated separately by year in the labor force (year since leaving school
for the cohort). Additionally we match the mean vacancy to unemployment rate (based on the
mean and standard deviation from Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008).
Before defining the moments, it is useful to define some notation. Let Ei,t be the employment
status of individual i in period t since entering the labor force, equal to one if employed and
zero if unemployed. Let Ji,t indicate that the worker is employed in t and t− 1, yet in diﬀerent
jobs. Finally, define wit as the log wage of individual i in period t and Eitwit is equal to zero
if the worker is not employed at t. We plot the moments computed on the data, along with
standard error bands and the simulated moments from the model in Figures 1, 2, and 3 below
(we comment on these plots when discussing model fit in Section 4.1).
These moments allow us to identify the model parameters as follows. The transitions in
and out of work and between jobs play a key role in identifying the job destruction rate ξ,
the intensity of on-the job search s1, and the overall level of matches α. In particular α is
identified by unemployment to employment transitions, s1 is identified by the job changing rate
(relative to transitions from unemployment) and ξ is identified by the rate of separations into
unemployment.
The variance of wages is directly linked to the variance of unobserved heterogeneity (or
equivalently its weight in the production function) and hence both f1 and f2 are directly linked
to the cross-sectional variance of wages. Through its eﬀect on productivity shocks and job
mobility, y is also linked to the variability of wage growth within and between jobs. Hence the
identification of the weight of y in output, f2, is also driven by the variance of wage growth,
conditional on all types of transition. Similarly the within and between-job variance of wage
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growth is informative about the rate of arrival of productivity shocks δ.
The remainder of the parameters are identified as following. The bargaining parameter β is
primarily identified by wages following a job change. So the key moment for this is wage growth
at job change. The parameter b in b(x) = f(x, b), which reflects the income flow while out of
work, is identified by the starting wage in the new jobs following unemployment. The flow cost
of vacancy posting c governs the profitability of posting vacancies, and is identified by matching
the vacancy to unemployment ratio, which is observed from macroeconomic data.
We use the evolution of the cohort moments over time to identify the degree of complemen-
tarity. In the absence of search frictions, any degree of complementarity (supermodularity) will
lead to perfect assortative matching (and no dynamics). With search frictions, there is a tradeoﬀ
between waiting for an improved match to take advantage of complementarities versus forming
a potentially inferior match. The frictions preclude perfect sorting, but on-the-job search im-
plies that workers will tend to move to better matches the longer they are employed. There is
no explicit notion of age in our stationary model. We thus measure time in the labor market
from the point when a cohort first enters unemployment. From then on an individual may have
further non-work spells, but time continues to increase. For brevity we refer to this time as age.
The resulting profile is then compared to the lifecycle evolution of the NLSY cohort from the
point it completes full time education.
If we consider such a cohort of workers who all initially start out unemployed and follow them
forward as they become employed and change jobs, the degree to which their wages spread out
is directly related to the degree of sorting in equilibrium. Additionally, if sorting is an important
feature of the labor market, the average gains to changing jobs will decline with time in the
labor market, as the cohort of workers move toward their ideal matches. Similarly, the variance
of wage changes should decline as there are fewer oﬀers that improve matches substantially
and workers make fewer transitions. Due to search frictions, the cohort of workers entering the
labor market following a spell out of work will start oﬀ mismatched, but if there are production
complementarities will become better and better matched through on-the-job search, and wages
will spread out. Alternatively, if there are no (or weak) production complementariness then
sorting is not a feature of the equilibrium, and wages will not spread out with time in the labor
force as there is no tendency for the economy to reallocate them across jobs. Thus the degree
of complementarity in production can be identified using the profile of wage growth and its
variance between jobs as well as within jobs.8
Finally the measurement error variance and persistence (σ2, ρ) are primarily identified by
the cross sectional variance of wages and variance of wage growth. Specifically any variance and
persistence not explained by the job mobility process will be interpreted as measurement error.
8The degree of complementarity will aﬀect the variance of wages within jobs because this is in part due to
responses to outside oﬀers. For the same reasons described above the oﬀers that will be able to move wages will
decline in frequency with time in the labor market.
16
Table 2: Model Fit
Less than High School High School College
Moments Compared Model Data Model Data Model Data
Employment rate 0.76 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.95 0.94
Change jobs given employment 0.03 0.04 0.019 0.024 0.009 0.013
Within Job Wage Growth 0.001 0.0026 0.0024 0.0025 0.0021 0.0021
Var of within job wage growth 0.0042 0.0049 0.0033 0.0038 0.003 0.003
Between Job Wage Growth 0.083 0.082 0.14 0.080 0.24 0.10
Var of between job wage growth 0.057 0.064 0.040 0.062 0.062 0.058
Note: Unit of time is a month. Wage growth is conditional on employment in both periods.
4 Estimation Results
The estimation results will be presented in five steps. First, we discuss how well the model fits
the moments. Then, we present parameter estimates. In the third subsection, we discuss the
implications for wage dynamics. The last two sections deal with sorting. First, we characterize
the implications of the model for sorting with respect to unobservable worker and firm charac-
teristics x and y. Second, we reconsider the information on sorting contained in the correlation
between worker and firm fixed eﬀects estimated from matched employer-employee data.
4.1 The fit of the moments
In Table 2 we present average (over age) unconditional moments related to employment, job
changes, and wage growth, both within and between jobs. In general the model does well in
fitting the average value of these moments, the only exception being between job wage growth,
which is overestimated for the two higher educated groups.
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we compare the full age profiles of the simulated and actual moments,
along with plus and minus two standard errors of the data moment. Moments with narrower the
standard error bands have larger weight in estimation.9 Fitting the evolution of the moments
poses a greater challenge for the model. By using the age profiles we require the model to fit
the individual level dynamics.
The degree to which the model fits the entire age profile varies from moment to moment
and across the education groups, but the model produces qualitatively the correct profiles. It
is reasonably successful at fitting job to job transitions, whose pattern may reflect the presence
of assortative matching. The decline in the rate of job to job transitions for the two higher
education groups and the relative constant rate for the lower skill group reflects the importance
of complementarities for the two top groups: their rate of job changing declines as they approach
the better suited matches. However for the lower skill group transition rates remain flat.
While the model is reasonably successful at fitting the age profiles for college educated
workers, it does less well in tracking the trends for the two lower educated groups of workers,
especially the the age profiles of employment transitions. It underestimates the continual decline
9This comparison does not reflect estimation error and hence provides a narrower confidence interval for
evaluating the diﬀerence between the model and the data moment.
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Figure 1: Model fit: Less than high school
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Figure 2: Model fit: High school graduate
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Figure 3: Model fit: College graduate
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Table 3: Autocovariances (autocorrelations) of within-job wage growth
less than HS HS grad college grad
Order Cov Corr Cov Corr Cov Corr
0 0.429 1.000 0.246 1.000 0.089 1.000
1 -0.140 -0.335 -0.075 -0.312 -0.020 -0.225
2 -0.052 -0.123 -0.032 -0.135 -0.011 -0.123
3 -0.004 -0.010 -0.005 -0.020 -0.003 -0.034
4 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 -0.025
5 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.020
6 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016
7 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011
8 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009
9 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.006
10 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004
Note: Autocovariances (autocorrelations) of the change in residual annual income, with zero mean by
construction. The simulated moments present the reduced form dynamics of annual income implied by
the model (including measurement error).
in the probability of being in diﬀerent employment states in two consecutive periods, becoming
relatively flat beyond the fifth year. This is true not only for the job to job transitions but
also for the unemployment to employment and the employment to unemployment transitions
(subplots a, b, c). Similarly, the model misses the continuous positive trend in earnings (subplot
d) for the two low educated groups, again flattening out after the first five year. The age profiles
of the moments related to wage growth and the variability of wage growth, however, are better
reproduced.
One obvious reason for the diﬃculty in capturing the lifecycle profiles is that we have not
allowed for human capital accumulation in the model. Hence all wage growth is due to the
search process and the associated counteroﬀers and wage mobility. A possible explanation for
the fact that the fit is better for college graduates may be that on-the-job learning is less
important for this group relative to search induced wage growth; that is, for college graduates,
wage growth is better explained by on-the-job search and the associated oﬀers and counteroﬀers
that it generates.10
4.2 Fit of individual wage dynamics
One of the issues we set out to investigate is whether our model can justify and explain the
dynamics of earnings we see in reduced form analyses such as those of MaCurdy (1982), Abowd
and Card (1989) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). This question has also been looked at in a
simpler model by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010), who find that their structural search model is
able to replicate the observed dynamics.
Because many of these shocks lead to permanent or in any case long-lasting wage gains or
10Incorporating human capital accumulation and stochastic shocks to individual ability into this model is
clearly outside the scope of this paper but is a part of our research agenda and ultimately an important element
of a labor market model for earnings.
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losses, they may well lead to the dynamics we observe in the data. To see whether this dynamic
structure leads to similar patterns as those we see in the data Table 3 presents the implied
auto-covariance structure, Cov(∆ut,∆ut−s), where ut is log annual earnings from the model
with measurement error added to match the observable data. We also remove the eﬀects of age
from growth, before constructing the autocovariances. Very much like in the results from the
actual data we find that autocovariances of order three or above are very low and eﬀectively zero.
Moreover, assuming ut to be the sum of a random walk plus an MA(1) shock, with stationary
innovations, implies a permanent shock whose variance is 0.045, 0.032 and 0.027 for the unskilled,
the high school graduates and the college graduates respectively.11 These numbers are similar in
magnitude to those calculated from the PSID (diﬀerent cohorts, diﬀerent time period) by Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004), who find 0.03, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. This confirms Postel-Vinay and
Turon’s observation that the observed autocovariances can be generated by the behavior of a
search model such as ours.
4.3 Parameter estimates
The parameters implied by our estimation are presented in Table 4. Turning first to the pro-
duction function we see that for the least skilled workers f3 = 0.72, implying approximately
an additive production function (elasticity of substitution equal to 3.6) and no real gains from
sorting in that labor market. Interestingly, because of search frictions there are still gains from
on-the-job search. Indeed, incumbent firms always try to retain employees subject to poaching
by increasing their wages. Note that poaching may still be successful even without complemen-
tarity in the production function. This is because the surplus function is in this case roughly
constant with respect to x but increasing in y. This happens because b(x) = f(x, b) increases
with x like f(x, y), whereas the cost of a vacancy is independent of y (see equation 12). For
the higher skill groups the substitution elasticities are (in ascending order of skill) 0.70 and 0.62
respectively: in both cases there are strong complementarities and gains from sorting. We look
at the implications below.
Turning now to the remaining parameters of the production function it is interesting to
note that for the college group job heterogeneity is much more important for production than
individual heterogeneity as shown by the relative size of f1 and f2. These parameters reflect both
the extent of heterogeneity among workers and jobs as well as the relative importance of such
characteristics in production. For the lowest skill group the contribution of jobs and individual
characteristics are about the same, while for the high school graduates individual characteristics
are more important, but job heterogeneity still plays an important role. For college graduates
however, job heterogeneity seems to be the dominant factor by far in determining output, relative
to individual heterogeneity x.
The exogenous monthly job destruction rate ξ is higher for the lower skill groups and implies
exogenous separations every 3, 8, and 21 years for the high school dropouts, high school graduates
and college graduates respectively. Endogenous separation can occur following a productivity
11We estimate the permanent variance as Var(∆u) + 2Cov(∆ut∆ut−1) + 2Cov(∆ut∆ut−2).
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates
Less than HS High school College
Production function parameters f1 3.6423 2.5111 0.4478
(0.1916) (0.0488) (0.0246)
f2 4.3058 1.6655 5.1736
(0.2340) (0.0775) (0.2972)
f3 0.7203 -0.4252 -0.6125
(0.0874) (0.0421) (0.0805)
Elasticity of substitution (1− f3)−1 3.576 0.702 0.620
Matching function parameters α 0.2725 0.5597 0.4865
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0144)
Search intensity s1/s0 1.1994 0.5193 0.2499
(0.1065) (0.0251) (0.0142)
Probability of exogenous job destruction ξ 0.0280 0.0099 0.0039
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Probability of shock to y δ 0.0086 0.0178 0.0028
(0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0002)
Home production parameter b 0.3975 0.7102 0.1245
(0.1750) (0.0070) (0.0490)
Vacancy posting cost c 0.6701 5.0198 4.3047
(0.0756) (0.0685) (0.0769)
Worker bargaining power β 0.6690 0.0306 0.0721
(0.0340) (0.0030) (0.0030)
SD of measurement error σ 0.0490 0.0380 0.0323
(0.0036) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Autocorrelation of measurement error ρ 0.5487 0.6403 0.5413
(0.1822) (0.0857) (0.2012)
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. Rates are per month.
Table 5: Implications for wage growth and job mobility
Less than High school College
high school graduate graduate
Probability of endogenous job destruction 0.000 0.0061 0.0006
Mean separation rate conditional on shock to y 0.000 0.342 0.207
Probability of job contact when unemployed 0.102 0.223 0.182
Mean matching rate given a contact 1.000 0.461 0.648
Probability of job contact when employed 0.123 0.116 0.045
Mean matching rate given a contact 0.256 0.161 0.161
Share of total wage changes occurring
at the same job 0.4082 0.5372 0.5064
at a job change 0.5918 0.4628 0.4936
Share of wage changes at same job due to
shocks 0.2093 0.2508 0.1764
counter oﬀers 0.7907 0.7492 0.8236
Fraction of wage changes that are positive
at the same job 0.7934 0.7558 0.828
at a job change 0.7084 0.4788 0.587
Note: Rates are per month.
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shock if the surplus becomes negative. This can occur either because of a resulting mismatch
(when sorting is important) or because the productivity shock is so negative that the job cannot
pay the worker their non-work value and still cover it own outside option. However, given the
CES production function, f(x, b) < f(x, y) if and only b < y whatever x: the second source of
sorting is therefore not expected to be important. In Table 5 we have calculated the probability of
an endogenous separation and the separation rate after a productivity shock. For the unskilled,
since sorting plays no role, we are not surprised to find that separations into unemployment can
only occur through exogenous job destruction. The role of such exogenous job destruction is
much reduced for the higher skill groups both because the overall transition into unemployment
is lower and because endogenous separations are more important at least for the high school
graduates: based on the estimate of δ, the jobs they work for receive a shock every 4.7 years
and in 34% of cases this leads to a transition into unemployment. Hence they are hit by an
endogenous job destruction shock every 13.7 years. For the low skill and the the college groups
the shocks are rare, which means they are not an important source of either transitions or of
wage renegotiations.
The flow value of home time (home production) b(x) is estimated to be equivalent to produc-
tion with a firm between the 12th and 71st percentile, with no monotonic relation to education
group. The monthly cost of posting a vacancy is much lower for recruiting unskilled workers than
for the other two groups. The other key parameter for our model is the bargaining parameter β,
with the results implying that unskilled workers obtain 67% of the surplus, while the two higher
skill groups only obtain 3.1% and 7.25% respectively. In other words their pay is determined
mainly from the sequential auction process. There is no evidence that an additional rent sharing
mechanism, besides Bertrand competition, is required to explain wage determination for skilled
workers.
The parameter estimates for the search technology (α and s1/s0) are better understood by
calculating the probabilities of job contact when employed and unemployed, which are displayed
in Table 5. The contact rates for the unskilled when unemployed are substantially lower (10.2%
a month) than for the two higher skill groups (22% and 18%). However the unskilled accept all
oﬀers when unemployed. Both the contact rate when working and the rate at which alternative
oﬀers are accepted declines with skill.
The sources of wage dynamics are shocks to productivity y that trigger wage renegotiation,
and outside oﬀers that lead to a counteroﬀer and/or job-to-job mobility. Table 5 decomposes
these diﬀerent sources over and above measurement error. For the unskilled 59% of wage changes
happen at job change. For the high school and college graduates these are split roughly evenly.
For all groups the predominant reason for a wage change at the same job is in response to
an outside oﬀer: 79%, 75% and 82% percent for the low, medium and high educated groups
respectively.
The last two parameters relate to measurement error. The estimated standard deviation
of monthly measurement error is low for all groups, between 0.03 and 0.05. The correlation
between any two months within a reporting year is estimated to be between 0.54 and 0.64,
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although without much precision.
4.4 Sorting with respect to unobserved characteristics
The key feature of our model is that it allows for the possibility of sorting, which has important
implications for the cost of mismatch. We have already demonstrated that our estimates imply
production complementarities at least for the two higher skill groups. This in itself would imply
perfect assortative matching in a first best world without search frictions. We now show the
extent of actual sorting in steady state, which in turn allows us to quantify an important welfare
loss due to mismatch in the presence of search frictions.
In Figure 4 we illustrate several aspects of the equilibrium allocation of workers to jobs. In
the the left hand panels (Figure 4.a) we plot the set of possible matches for the three skill groups:
{x, y|S(x, y) ≥ 0}. In the unskilled market any firm will match with any worker: the small gains
from matching with someone of a similar rank (implied by the high substitution elasticity of 3.6)
are not enough to make it worthwhile remaining unemployed (or vacant) and waiting for a better
match. However, in the higher skill groups, matches between high type workers and low type
firms and between low type workers and high type firms never occur, which is a manifestation of
the production complementarities that induce sorting: when worker and job pairs in that region
meet they prefer to wait. Of course, even if all matches are possible there can be positive sorting
if the surplus is not strictly increasing in x and y, leading to the density of matches concentrated
on the diagonal from the origin to the top right through the process of on-the-job-search. We
now look at sorting in greater detail.
In the centre panels (Figure 4.b) we plot the contour lines of the surplus function S(x, y).
Turning first to the college graduates, we can clearly see the eﬀect that on-the-job search will
have on sorting. For example, consider a college educated worker at the 60th percentile. The
surplus created with any job is positive for this worker, however, the surplus initially increases
in the type of the job, is maximized when matched to a job at the 60th percentile, and then
declines again. This worker will initially match with any job, but will always move to a job that
is closer to the 60th percentile, which may involve moving up or down the quantiles of y. The
surplus functions for the two higher educated groups are both highest close to the 45 degree
line: both workers and firms would prefer match with a partner of a similar type. The surplus
function for the low skilled (panel (a)) is quite diﬀerent. For this group the surplus is always
highest when a worker (job) is matched with the best job (worker). At the same time, there is
small amount of non-monotonicity in the surplus when considering matches with workers below
the median. In this range, the small degree of complementarity in production induces a local
maximum near the 45 degree line, which is suﬃcient to induce workers below the median to
move to lower y matches in this region, although they would always move to the very top jobs
when the opportunity arises. Low educated workers above the median always prefer to move to
higher ranked jobs.
In the right hand panels (Figure 4.c) we illustrate the implication of complementarity com-
bined with on-the-job search by plotting the contours of the joint distribution of matches, h(x, y).
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(a) Matching set (b) Surplus function (c) Distribution of matches
Figure 4: Equilibrium matching sets, surplus function and distribution of matches
Note: In panels (a) we plot the set of matches that are formed between unemployed workers and vacant
jobs: {x, y|S(s, y) ≥ 0}. The green shaded area represents the decentralized matching set, the dashed
lines are the boundaries of the constrained social planner’s matching set, approximated by MSP (x, y) =n
x, y|x >PIi=1 τiyi−1, y >PJj=1 τjxj−1o. In panels (b) we plot the contours of the Surplus function S(x, y).
In panels (c) we plot the distribution of matches h(x, y).
26
Looking first at the two higher educated group of workers, see that the distribution of matches
is highest close to the 45 degree line. Indeed, although workers initially form matches accord-
ing to the large matching set presented in panel (a), they leave these low surplus matches for
higher surplus matches with jobs at a similar quantile whenever the opportunity arises. In the
stationary equilibrium there are very few matches that are very far from the diagonal.
The distribution of matches for the lowest education group is a little more involved. There is
some sorting among the below median matches since the production function is not quite additive
and complementarities outweigh individual contributions in this range. The local maximum in
the surplus function that occurs for workers below the median implies that workers prefer to
move to a job of a similar quantile to their own ability, unless it is substantially higher (above
the 75th–80th percentile). For workers above the median they always prefer to move to a higher
ranked job when given the opportunity. The result is that there is a high concentration of
matches along the 45 degree line below the the median. Above the median things look diﬀerent.
Within a job-type, the distribution of workers above the median is uniform (firms accept all
workers and these workers are all moving in and out of job-types at the same rate). Additionally,
for firms above the 80th percentile, all workers are equally represented, as they all agree on the
desirability of these matches. Finally, it is interesting to note that for workers above the median,
their distribution across firm types in humped shape, with the mode around the 75th percentile.
This hump shape is the result of the eﬀect that the job-changing decisions of the workers below
the median has on the equilibrium distribution of vacancies. Since workers below the median
will leave their current job for either a job closer to their own type, or a job above the 80th
percentile, there is additional competition for vacancies above the 80th percentile from the point
of view of above median workers.
In conclusion, there is a lot of sorting in the economy and plenty of mismatch, which leads to
important welfare losses relative to a world with no search frictions or no congestion externalities.
We characterize these losses in Section 5.
4.5 Measuring sorting with wage data only
The availability of matched employer employee data has motivated empirical research on the
distribution of wages across workers and firms. Indeed the availability of such data allows to
identify worker and firm fixed eﬀects in a standard Mincer wage equation. Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) and a few other studies (see the introduction for references) implemented
this idea and concluded that there is very little evidence of sorting, based on the small estimated
correlation between worker and firm eﬀects. However, this approach to measuring sorting was
recently disputed first theoretically (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011) and then empirically (Lopes de
Melo, 2009, Bagger and Lentz, 2012 and Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii, 2012).
The key diﬃculty lies in the fact that in the presence of productive complementarities there
is a non-monotonic relationship, in general, between match surplus and the firm type (worker
type). Since the maximum possible wage a worker can earn in a match is directly controlled
by the match surplus, this implies that there will also be a non-monotonic relationship between
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wages and the firm type (worker type) when production complementarities are important. This
theoretical point was made by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) and illustrated using a simple search
model. In the model we estimate, there are additional forces at work that may amplify or mute
this eﬀect, such as on-the-job search, shocks to the productivity of the job, and the fact that
wages reflect both the surplus in the current match and the surplus at the worker’s outside
option.
To illustrate the relationship between wages, surplus, and firm types we calculate the range
of potential wage paid to a worker in each possible (x, y) match. The highest possible wage is
the wage that gives the entire match surplus to the worker and is implicitly defined by
W1(w, x, y)−W0(x) = S(x, y). (17)
The lowest possible wage paid to a worker in an (x, y) match gives the worker a share β of the
match surplus and is implicitly defined by
W1(w, x, y)−W0(x) = βS(x, y). (18)
In Figure 5 we present information on wage setting by worker and firm characteristics. We
plot, separately by decile of the worker type distribution, the maximum wage against the match
surplus (left hand panels) and against the firm type in the match (right hand panel).12 While
maximum wages are strictly increasing in match surplus for all education groups, the non-
monotonicity of wages by either firm-type or worker-type is clear for the two higher eduction
groups.
It is then clear that any empirical strategy designed to measure the degree of sorting of
workers across firms that relies on a monotonic relation between wages and firm types is likely
to do poorly in this environment. As an illustration, we apply the fixed eﬀects estimation
strategy of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) to data simulated from our model at our
estimated parameters. Specifically, we simulate panel data and for each worker we keep track
of their wage, their id, and the id of the firm they are employed at. To construct a firm id we
assign them the firm type at the start of the match. We estimate the following wage equation:
wijt = φi + ψj(i,t) + uijt, (19)
where the subscript j(i, t) denotes the firm j in which individual (i) is working in period t. The
reduced form sorting measure is the the correlation between the estimated worker fixed eﬀect φi
and the firm fixed eﬀect ψj(i,t) of the firms at which they worked. This can be compared to the
actual correlation implied by solving the model
Table 6 presents results from this comparison. The correlations between worker and firm
12To keep the figures as clear as possible we do not plot the minimum possible wage. For for two highest
eduction groups β is estimated to be close to zero, implying that the lowest possible wage is approximately
constant across all firms for a given worker type, and equal to the maximum possible wage at the match where
S(x, y) = 0. For the lowest education group the lowest possible wage is approximately a shift down from the
maximum possible wage.
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Figure 5: Maximum possible wage
Note: We plot the maximum possible wage in a match by: decile of worker type against match surplus (left hand
panels); decile of worker type against firm type (centre panels); and decile of firm type against worker type (right
hand panels).
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Table 6: Actual and estimated sorting patterns
Corr(x, y) Corr(φˆi, ψˆj)
(i) (ii)
Less than high school 0.338 -0.008 0.007
High school graduate 0.846 -0.236 -0.248
College graduate 0.858 0.644 0.315
Note: The column labeled Corr(x, y) presents the correlation between worker type and firm type based
on the equilibrium distribution of matches in the model, h(x, y). The columns under Corr(φˆi, ψˆj) present
the correlations between estimated worker and firm fixed eﬀects, based on two diﬀerent samples: (i) is
based on a simulation from the stationary version of the model; (ii) is based on the first 10 years of labor
market experience for a cohort who start unemployed.
types implied by the model are positive for all education groups. It is a moderate 0.34 for the
high school dropouts, and strong for both high school and college graduates at 0.85 and 0.86
respectively. We present two diﬀerent estimates for the correlation of estimated fixed eﬀects.
The first (i) uses a ten year sample drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model. The
second (ii) uses a sample of with a lot of mobility, corresponding to the first 10 years in the
labor force for a given cohort. Looking at column (i), the correlation between estimated fixed
eﬀects is eﬀectively zero for the low education group, despite the model correlation of 0.34. For
the high school graduates, the correlation in estimated fixed eﬀects is −0.24 compared to the
model correlation of 0.85. We do not even obtain the correct sign for the correlation. Finally,
the correlation between estimated fixed eﬀects for the college graduates is 0.64 compared to that
of 0.86 implied by the model.
The correlation between estimated fixed eﬀects is clearly not a useful measure for the degree
or sorting or the degree of complementary in this environment. Indeed, while the true model
correlations are almost equal for high school and college graduates at 0.85 and 0.86, the fixed
eﬀect correlations are of opposite sign -0.24 and 0.64. This diﬀerence can be traced to several
other important diﬀerences between labor markets for the high school and college workers.
Considering again the parameter estimates in Table 4, we see that there is somewhat more
job turnover among the high school graduates; the exogenous job destruction rate is 2.5 times
as high as for college graduates, and the probability of a shock to the match productivity is
six times as likely. The implication is that college graduates tend to have a relatively stable
career, moving to better matches when the opportunity arises, with very little variability in the
quality for any given match. High school graduates on the other hand tend to be separated to
unemployment much more often, restarting the process of finding a good match. In addition,
the productivity at their current match is subject to relatively high variability. A second big
diﬀerence between these two labor markets are the estimates for the relative importance of firm
to worker heterogeneity, measured as the ratio of f2/f1, which is 0.66 for high school graduates
and 11.6 for college graduates. College graduates face much larger diﬀerences in productivity
across jobs than high school graduates. The eﬀect of mobility on the correlation of estimated
fixed eﬀects can be seen in column (ii) of Table 6, where the estimates are based on a sample
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of workers in their first 10 years in the labor force. While the correlation does not change much
for the high school graduates, the correlation falls from 0.64 to 0.32 for the college graduates,
reflecting the fact that for this sample we observe workers moving from originally mismatches
jobs (which could have high y) to better jobs (possibly at lower y).
Summing up, it is clear that simply looking a the correlations between fixed eﬀects in wages
is insuﬃcient to inform us about the degree of sorting in a labor market. Some additional
information about how workers move between employment states and between jobs, combined
with the implications for wages of these moves needs to be incorporated. Since sorting is by
definition a statement about an equilibrium outcome, it is necessary to have a model in which
the allocation of workers across jobs is an equilibrium outcome, and at the same time can
account for the observation that workers continue to move between states of unemployment and
employment, as well as between jobs.
Finally, note that recent work by Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2012) also builds on
the sequential auction model with bargaining that they extend to allow for endogenous search
intensity. There, sorting stems both from the value of a job not being necessarily greater than the
value of unemployment and also because more able workers search more intensely. In their model,
however, there are no productivity shocks, vacancy creation is not modeled and the value of a
vacancy is always zero, which makes welfare analysis and policy evaluation less pertinent. Still,
their work delivers a rich set of interesting results. Confirming Atakan’s (2006) insight,13 they
show that positive (negative) sorting holds if the match production function is supermodular
(submodular); using Danish matched employer-employee data they find evidence of modest
positive sorting between worker skill and firm technology; lastly, they confirm Eeckhout and
Kircher’s point about the non-identification of sorting from wage data only. The correlation
between wage equation worker and firm fixed eﬀects can be positive when the production function
is submodular if workers’ bargaining power is weak. They also show that the estimators of sorting
proposed by Lopes de Melo (2009) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) do not work as they are
always positive whether the production function is sub- or supermodular.14 Bagger and Lentz
identify sorting from the correlation between unemployment duration and wages for workers
hired by the most productive firms; most productive firms can be identified because they are
the most likely to successfully poach.15
13Shimer and Smith show that complementarity in production is not a suﬃcient condition for assortative
matching in equilibrium. Atakan shows that it is in presence of search costs.
14Lopes de Melo proposes to use the correlation between the worker fixed eﬀect and the average worker fixed
eﬀect of the co-workers within the firm. Eeckhout and Kircher suggest to use the population variance relative to
the average within firm worker fixed eﬀect variance.
15Another set of studies use firm data to estimate firm-specific total factor productivity (TFP) and correlate
it with the distribution of skills or wages within the firms. See Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999), Abowd,
Haltiwanger, Lane, McKinney, and Sandusky (2007), van den Berg and van Vuuren (2010), Mendes, van den
Berg, and Lindeboom (2010).
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5 Welfare Analysis
5.1 The impact of search frictions
The potential for welfare-enhancing labor market regulation arises from the job search frictions
and the externalities they cause during the job allocation process. The externalities arise from
the classic issue of “overcrowding” among job seekers, i.e. when an extra person seeks a job it
reduces the arrival rate for others, or among vacancies, as implied by the matching function. An
extra dimension arises in our model because of heterogeneity and sorting: by having low quality
jobs compete for workers they lengthen the time it takes to fill higher productivity ones, without
adding much when they are filled (because they have zero or near zero surplus).16 This implies
that because of complementarity, cutting some low productivity jobs may increase welfare, even
if this means that some very low productivity workers never work. An additional ineﬃciency
comes from the fact that workers can seek outside oﬀers to increase their share of the match
surplus. As a result, workers are willing to form matches even when the current output of the
match is below what they could produce at home, allowing also for the cost of the vacancy:
f(x, y) < b(x) − c. Even though the worker and firm are producing less together than they
would separately, the fact that the firm has monopsony power up front means it is willing to
hire the worker and extract most of the match surplus during the early periods of the match.
The worker is willing to be in the match as it provides a better outside option so as to extract
surplus via poaching firms.
Any regulatory intervention in the labor market will improve welfare only to the extent that
it can address the externalities discussed above, and to the extent to which they are significant.
Thus, to provide a measure of the potential welfare gains from labor market regulation (such
as in work benefits, unemployment insurance, minimum wages, severance pay etc.) we solve
the planners problem respecting the constraints arising from search frictions. Specifically the
planner maximizes total output and home production subject to the flow constraints implied
implied by the frictions and the costs of vacancies, i.e.
max
hSP ,uSP ,V SP
￿
f(x, y)hSP (x, y) dx dy +
￿
b(x)uSP (x) dx− cV SP (20)
subject to the equations (13), (14), (15), (16) and V =
￿
v(y)dy. In the above the superscript SP
is used to distinguish the endogenous objects chosen by the planner as opposed to those arising
in a decentralized economy. An equivalent formulation to directly choosing the distribution of
matches is to have the planner choose the set of admissible matches MSP(x, y) and the measure
of jobs NSP . We approximate the solution to the planner’s problem by specifying the boundaries
of the matching set as polynomials: MSP (x, y) =
￿
x, y|x >￿Ii=1 τiyi−1, y >￿Jj=1 τjxj−1￿. We
find that polynomials of order I, J = 4 provide a good approximation as no increase in steady
state output is found by further increasing the degree of polynomial.
Table 7 shows the breakdown of contributions to total welfare under diﬀerent scenarios. The
16see also Sattinger (1995)
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Table 7: Output and Employment
Decentralized Constrained Frictionless Frictionless Optimal
Frictional Planner with Actual with Full Unemployment
Employment Employment Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Less than high school
Welfare 100.00 100.00 108.91 140.79 100.00
Match Output 108.17 108.17 117.08 140.78 108.17
Home Production 5.22 5.22 5.22 0.01 5.22
Recruiting Costs -13.39 -13.39 -13.39 0.00 -13.39
E/L 78.52 78.52 78.52 94.87 78.52
N/L 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.87 94.87
V/U 76.13 76.13 76.13 - 76.13
Match quality 100.00 100.00 108.24 107.72 100.00
Corr(x, y) 0.32 0.32 1.00 1.00 0.32
High school graduate
Welfare 100.00 109.71 124.06 164.02 105.92
Match Output 115.69 92.27 139.75 163.98 88.46
Home Production 12.83 29.71 12.83 0.04 33.69
Recruiting Costs -28.52 -12.27 -28.52 0.00 -16.23
E/L 86.57 67.67 86.57 95.85 66.30
N/L 95.85 71.66 95.85 95.85 71.58
V/U 69.10 12.36 69.10 - 15.67
Match quality 100.00 102.24 121.05 128.31 100.04
Corr(x, y) 0.81 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.80
College graduate
Welfare 100.00 101.92 107.75 125.24 100.00
Match Output 114.98 112.40 122.74 125.24 114.98
Home Production 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02
Recruiting Costs -15.00 -10.51 -15.00 0.00 -15.00
E/L 96.35 93.16 96.35 100.00 96.35
N/L 100.22 95.88 100.22 100.22 100.22
V/U 106.01 40.00 106.01 - 106.01
Match quality 100.00 101.10 106.75 104.94 100.00
Corr(x, y) 0.83 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.83
Notes: Column (1) is the estimated economy. In column (2) the constrained planner chooses admissible matches
to maximize steady state output. Here we restrict the planner to choosing a reservation type for x and y,
approximated by a fourth order polynomial: MSP (x, y) =
n
x, y|x >P4i=1 τiyi−1, y >P4j=1 τjxj−1o, and the
measure of firms active in the market N . The frictionless benchmarks of columns (3) and (4) hold N/L at
the estimated decentralized level and force the positive assortative allocation {x, y(x)}. Column (3) keeps the
same unemployment and vacancy distributions u(x) and v(y) as in the benchmark. In column (4) we optimally
reallocate workers across firms and employment states, filling all possible jobs with a worker. In column (5),
optimal unemployment insurance policy is modeled as proportional to home production: b0b(x) and we impose
the balanced budget b0
R
b(x)u(x) dx = τ
R
f(x, y)h(x, y) dx dy. The implied policy parameters are less than high
school: τ = 0, b0 = 0; high school: τ = 0.09, b0 = 0.24; and college: τ = 0, b0 = 0. Match quality is defined as
average match output, normalized to 100 for the decentralized economy.33
first column relates to the fully decentralized economy we observe from the data. The second
column shows the results of the planner maximizing welfare as in (20). For the lowest education
group the constrained planner is not able to improve on the decentralized outcome. For the
two higher education groups the planner can attain an increase in welfare of 9.7% and 1.9%
respectively. The planner wants to improve average match quality (output per match), increase
unemployment and reduce the number of jobs at the same time. This is more dramatically true
for high school graduates. To understand what is going on, note that increased match eﬃciency
contributes very little to the welfare increase. Output per match increases by a moderate
2.0% and 1.1%, respectively, for the two skilled groups. Hence, the main source of ineﬃciency
is that vacancy costs are too big. With fewer jobs, there are fewer vacancies. This creates
unemployment, but for high school graduates this is acceptable because they are very good at
producing at home. For college graduates, b is estimated much lower, so the job reduction is
much smaller.
For the lowest education group the constrained planner is not able to improve on the de-
centralized outcome. This has a key implication: we cannot justify any type of labor market
regulation for the lowest skill group on the basis that it is welfare improving. Some corrective
policy could be designed for the other groups but this is rarely the focus of policy.17 Thus labor
market regulation cannot be eﬀective as an antipoverty measure. In particular the minimum
wage here will be welfare reducing; severance pay on its own would be neutral (as in Lazear,
1990) or welfare reducing if combined with minimum wages. Of course, diﬀerent individual
weights in the welfare function, or a diﬀerent way of valuing inequality, could obviously change
that result.
Anti poverty measures need to address search frictions: for the lowest skill group policies
that improve search technology could improve welfare by up to 46%. Part of this increase comes
from reducing unemployment. But part also comes from improving sorting since the elasticity
of substitution, albeit large is not infinite (it is 3.6). This can be seen from the fourth column
of Table 7 where unemployment is kept equal to the level in the benchmark economy.
5.2 The welfare eﬀects of mismatch
Search frictions prevent positive assortative matching and cause unemployment. Indeed there
are varying degrees of complementarity in production for all three education groups and the
extent to which mismatch causes welfare losses will vary. One way of gauging this is to ignore
search frictions and sort workers and jobs optimally imposing perfect assortative matching as
in Becker (1973).18 Column (3) runs the counterfactual experiment where u(x) and v(y) are
kept the same as estimated but h(x, y) is changed into [L − u(x)]1{y = y(x)}, which is the
distribution of matches that is obtained by imposing the optimal job match to each employed
worker (y(x) = argmaxy S(x, y)). Match quality increases by 8.24 percentage points for unskilled
17Notwithstanding the suspicious aim of the policy: improving output per match mainly by reducing the
number of jobs.
18See Gautier and Teulings (2012) for an interesting approach to measuring the cost of search frictions in the
presence of sorting, albeit in the context of a simpler model
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workers and by 21.05 and 6.75, respectively, for the two skilled groups. The increases in welfare
are quite similar at 8.91, 24.06 and 7.75, percentage points.
In column (4), we run a similar counterfactual in which we assign all jobs to workers. Un-
employment is drastically reduced and welfare increases a lot, largely because there are no
recruiting costs, but not necessarily because of reduced unemployment, as imposing full employ-
ment implies slightly lower match quality for the lowest and highest education groups (see also
the discussion in Subsection 6.2).
6 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
The final column of Table 7 presents the welfare (output) gains from an optimal unemploy-
ment insurance policy: here optimal refers to the policy that maximizes total output and home
production, subject to the constraints that arise from the existence of search frictions. We ap-
proximate unemployment insurance as a payment proportional to home production, which is
positively related to permanent income: (1 + b0) b(x). Benefits are funded by a proportional tax
on match output: b0
￿
b(x)u(x) dx = τ
￿
f(x, y)h(x, y) dx dy.
6.1 Overall eﬃciency gains
Since the constrained planner is unable to improve over the decentralized outcome for the lowest
education group it is optimal to have no unemployment insurance for this group. In interpreting
this result note that utility here is linear and workers are thus assumed risk neutral; hence UI has
no insurance benefit per se but could improve welfare by altering the job acceptance probabilities
and indirectly eliminating very low value matches. Allowing for risk aversion and/or for liquidity
constraints would add an additional channel to make UI welfare improving. We also find that it is
optimal to have no unemployment insurance for the college graduates, despite the potential gain
of 1.9 percent obtained by the constrained planner: for this group the relatively crude policy tool
of unemployment insurance is too far from what the planner would do to produce any benefits.
Finally, for the high school graduates, we find that optimal unemployment insurance can deliver
5.9% of improved welfare, corresponding to 60 percent of the potential gains attainable by the
constrained planner. This involves increasing the baseline flow utility of being out of work (home
production) for each individual by 24 percent and taxing output at 9 percent.
It is worth noting again that the improvement in steady state output comes from very
diﬀerent sources when comparing the elimination of frictions to the constrained planner or
optimal unemployment insurance scheme. With the removal of frictions there is a direct increase
in market production and a gain when netting out the costs of vacancy creation from home
production. For the groups where the constrained planner can improve steady state output,
this is implemented largely by raising unemployment and reducing the number of vacancies,
resulting in lower vacancy creation costs, high levels of home production, and improving the
average quality of productive matches.
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Figure 6: Welfare diﬀerence in value of unemployment by worker type
Note: We calculate the distributional impact for the high school educated group, where the optimal unemployment
insurance scheme implies a five percent gain in steady state output. This is calculated as 100× WUI0 (x)−W0(x)W0(x) .
6.2 The redistributive eﬀects of the policy
As discussed above, we find that there is a potential gain from an optimal unemployment in-
surance scheme for the high school graduates, but not for either the lower or higher education
groups. For the high school drop-outs there are simply no eﬃciency gains to realize (short
of eliminating frictions) while for the college graduates the cost of increasing the duration of
unemployment spells outweighs the benefit from improved matches. In addition to overall ef-
ficiency gains, we are also interested in the redistributive eﬀects of policy. In an environment
with heterogeneous workers it is not necessarily the case that an increase in steady state output
will benefit all workers the same, indeed it may harm some. In Figure 6 we plot the diﬀerence
in value, by worker type x, between being unemployed in an economy with and without the
optimal unemployment insurance scheme. While the value of unemployment is higher for all
worker types above the first quintile in the environment with UI, the value of unemployment is
substantially lower for the bottom twenty percent of worker types. The increase in unemploy-
ment duration that improves match quality is born disproportionately by the low type workers
who now have many fewer jobs to match with; they also receive lower net wages when employed
due to the tax on output, and are not fully compensated by the marginal increase in benefits
when unemployed. The unemployment insurance scheme, while improving overall steady state
output, also has the side eﬀect of transfer from the lowest skilled to the higher skilled. As a
result the group that is usually the target of such policies ends up worse oﬀ.
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7 Conclusion and Further Work
We develop an equilibrium model of employment and wage determination, which builds on the
work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Shimer and Smith (2000). In our model both workers
and firms are heterogeneous, their productivity characteristics are potentially complementary in
production creating the possibility of sorting. However, firms are subject to productivity shocks.
Workers can search both on and oﬀ the job. This creates an environment where there may be
potential for welfare improving labor market regulation. Moreover our framework is well suited
to consider the redistributive (as well as eﬃciency) implications of policy. The scope for and
impact of policy is thus an empirical issue in our model.
We estimate the model based on NLSY data and find strong evidence of sorting among
all but the labor market for the lowest education workers For the higher educational groups
these complementarities imply large eﬃciency losses due to mismatch between job and worker
productivities caused by search frictions.
Mismatch is a source of ineﬃciency that labor market regulation cannot correct; this would
require changing the job search technology, improving job finding rates and enabling more mo-
bility following shocks. Policies such as unemployment insurance can improve eﬃciency to the
extent that they address the externalities induced by search frictions. We establish that these
are very small. We then show that the optimal unemployment insurance benefits are zero for
the lowest and highest education group, and moderate for the high school graduates. Moreover
we show that even for this group where there are eﬃciency gains, the policy would redistribute
wealth from low skilled workers to workers above the first quintile of the skill distribution.
Our model opens up an empirical research agenda on which to build and address important
issues. We demonstrate the importance of heterogeneity, sorting and search frictions. Among
these are the welfare and labor market eﬀects of risk and the role of assets in determining the
wage oﬀer distribution and the role of investment in human capital. Similarly, an important
extension of such a model is considering investment decisions by forms and how this can aﬀect
productivity y which we took as given. Finally, this kind of model is well suited to interpreting
matched employer employee data. Indeed such data could aid identification by providing direct
information on firm level productivity, and on the distribution of worker types employed at the
same firm type. However, when we move to such data new, important and diﬃcult questions
arise when defining wage setting in an environment with sorting and multiple workers per firm.
This is of course an important future research area.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 The Continuation value and the equation for the surplus
Let P (x, y) be the value of joint production of an (x, y) match. Then the surplus is defined by P (x, y)−
W0(x)−Π0(y) = S(x, y). Assume jobs can also be destroyed at an exogenous rate ξ. Then we have that
rP (x, y) = f(x, y) + ξ [W0(x) +Π0(y)− P (x, y)]
+s1κ
￿
[max {P (x, y),Π0(y) +W0(x) + S(x, y) + β [S(x, y￿)− S(x, y)]}− P (x, y)] v(y￿) dy￿
+δ
￿
[max {P (x, y￿),W0(x) +Π0(y￿)}− P (x, y)] dy￿
= f(x, y)− ξS(x, y)
+s1κ
￿
[max {0,β [S(x, y￿)− S(x, y)]}] v(y￿) dy￿
+δ
￿
[max {P (x, y￿)−W0(x)−Π0(y￿), 0}− P (x, y) +W0(x) +Π0(y￿)] dy￿
= f(x, y)− ξS(x, y)
+s1κβ
￿
[S(x, y￿)− S(x, y)]+ v(y￿) dy￿
+δ
￿
S(x, y￿)+ dy￿ − δS(x, y) + δ
￿
[Π0(y￿)−Π0(y)] dy￿
Then, substituting out rW0(x) and rΠ0(y), we have S(x, y) defined by the fixed point
(r + ξ + δ)S(x, y) = f(x, y)− b(x) + c
− s0κβ
￿
S(x, y)+v(y) dy − s0κ (1− β)
￿
S(x, y)+u(x) dx
− s1κ (1− β)
￿￿
[S(x, y)− S(x, y￿)]+ h(x, y￿) dx dy
+ s1κβ
￿
[S(x, y￿)− S(x, y)]+ v(y￿) dy￿ + δ
￿
S(x, y￿)+ dy￿. (21)
Note that ￿
r + δ + ξ + s1κv(B(x, y))
￿ ∂S(x, y)
∂y
=
∂f(x, y)
∂y
− (r + δ)Π￿0(y), (22)
where
B(x, y) = {y￿ : S(x, y￿) ≥ S(x, y)},
and µ (A) =
￿
A µ(y) dy, for any set A and any measure density µ. Therefore, for any x, the set of y’s
maximizing the surplus S(x, y) is the set of y’s maximizing the surplus flow f(x, y)− rW0(x)− rΠ0(y).
A.2 The expected profits of a vacant job increase with productivity
From the previous expression note also that
(r + δ)Π￿0(y) = s0κ (1− β)
￿
S(x,y)≥0
∂S(x, y)
∂y
u(x) dx+ s1κ (1− β)
￿
h(x,B(x, y))
∂S(x, y)
∂y
dx, (23)
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where B(x, y) is the set of jobs with a productivity y￿ leading to a lower surplus than the pair (x, y),
B(x, y) = {y￿ : S(x, y) ≥ S(x, y￿)} .
Hence, plugging the above expression for ∂S(x, y)/∂y in equation (23) shows that Π￿0(y) is positive if
∂f(x, y)/∂y is positive.
B Computing the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by knowledge of the number of jobs N , the labor market tightness
κ(U, V ), the joint distribution of active matches h(x, y), and the surplus function S(x, y). A fixed point
iterative algorithm operating on (κ, h, S) can be constructed as follows.
First, with inputs κ, h(x, y) and S(x, y),
1. Calculate u(x) using (15) and calculate U =
￿
u(x) dx.
2. Solve for V in equation
κ =
M (s0U + s1(L− U), V )
[s0U + s1(L− U)]V .
3. Calculate N = V + L− U and calculate v(y) with equation (16).
Second,
1. Update h using equation (14) as
h(x, y)← δ
￿
h(x, y￿) dy￿ + [s0u(x) + s1h (x,B(x, y))]κv(y)
δ + ξ + s1κv
￿
B(x, y)
￿ 1{S(x, y) ≥ 0}. (24)
2. Update S using equation (12).
3. Update κ using the free entry equation (10)
κ← (c− δΠ0)/(1− β)
s0
￿
S (x, 0)+ u(x) dx+ s1
￿
[S (x, 0)− S(x, y￿)]+ h(x, y￿) dx dy￿ . (25)
Alternatively, one can solve for (h, S) for a given κ and search for the κ that satisfies the free entry
condition. The full iterative fixed point algorithm does not indeed guaranty positive updates for κ.
C Chernozhukov and Hong’s Algorithm for SMM
The estimation procedure of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) consists of simulating a chain of parameters
that (once converged) has the quasi-posterior density
p (θ) =
eLN (θ)π (θ)￿
eLN (θ)π (θ) dθ
.
A point estimate for the parameters is obtained as the average of the NS elements of the converged
MCMC chain:
θˆMCMC =
1
NS
NS￿
j=1
θj ,
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and standard errors are computed as the standard deviation of the sequence of θj . To simulate a chain
that converges to the quasi posterior, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The algorithm generates
a chain
￿
θ0, θ1, ..., θNS
￿
as follows. First, choose a starting value θ0. Next, generate ψ from a proposal
density q(ψ|θj) and update θj+1 from θj for j = 1, 2, ... using
θj+1 =
￿
ψ with probability d(θj ,ψ)
θj with probability 1− d(θj ,ψ),
where
d (θ,ψ) = min
￿
eLN (ψ)π(ψ)q(θ|ψ)
eLN (θ)π(θ)q(ψ|θ) , 1
￿
.
This procedure is repeated many times to obtain a chain of length NS that represents the ergodic
distribution of θ. Choosing the prior π(θ) to be uniform and the proposal density to be a random walk
(q(θ|ψ) = q(ψ|θ)), results in the simple rule
d(θ,ψ) = min
￿
eLN (ψ)−LN (θ), 1
￿
.
The main advantage of this estimation strategy is that it only requires function evaluations, and thus
discontinuous jumps do not cause the same problems that would occur with a gradient based extremum
estimator. Additionally, the converged chain provides a direct way to construct valid confidence intervals
or standard errors for the parameter estimates if the optimal weighting matrix is used.19 The drawback
of the procedure is that it requires a very long chain, and consequently a very large number of function
evaluations, each requiring the model to be solved and simulated. In practice, we simulate 100 chains in
parallel, each of length 10,000, and use the last 1,000 elements (pooled over the 100 chains) to obtain
parameter estimates and the standard errors.20
19To avoid the problem similar to that pointed out by Altonji and Segal (1996) we decided against using
the optimal weight matrix. Indeed using it did not give sensible results. In this case the chain converges to a
stationary process where the variance is a consistent estimator of the inverse of the Hessian J−1 (Theorem 1 of
Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003) and the sandwich estimator (J−1IJ−1) has to be used to calculate standard errors
appropriately. Because of the lack of precision in the numerical approximation of the gradient G(θ) = ∇θ bmMS (θ)
(with bI = G(bθ)TcW−1N G(bθ)), we report the variance of the MC chain ( bJ−1). This is still informative. (Discussions
with Han Hong and Ron Gallant helped us to understand this.)
20Details pertaining to tuning the MCMC algorithm, a parallel implementation, and related methods in statis-
tics can be found in Robert and Casella (2004), Vrugt, ter Braak, Diks, Higdon, Robinson, and Hyman (2009),
Sisson and Fan (2011).
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